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Veteran Politics in Restoration England, 1660–1670
David J. Appleby*
Department of History, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
In 1660, whilst readily accepting the chance to reclaim the crown, Charles II and his
supporters were aware of the risks. On 29 May, just hours before his triumphal procession
into London, Charles received a discomforting reminder of the recent past when several
regiments of the “Old Army” of the Commonwealth were drawn up for his inspection at
Blackheath. This was the army which had engineered his father’s execution, defeated
Charles himself at Worcester, repressed his supporters in Britain and fought them in
Flanders. Clarendon’s published account gives the impression that 50,000 soldiers were
present, whereas the actual figure was closer to three thousand. Nevertheless, the army as
a whole probably did number around 50,000 men; a large proportion of whom were battle-
hardened troops.1 The royal party left the heath in no doubt that the military capacity of the
well-equipped, well-drilled Commonwealth regiments far outstripped their own.
Other bodies of veterans merited equally sensitive handling: a petition presented to
Parliament in 1659 on behalf of 6500 war pensioners had already indicated that huge
numbers of maimed parliamentarian veterans and war widows would remain reliant on
public charity after the Restoration.2 The new regime had also to consider the attitudes of
thousands of able-bodied veterans who had already returned to civilian life. There was a
distinct chance that such men might foment disaffection among the wider population.
Former soldiers were certainly suspected, for example, when newly erected royal arms
began to be defaced in parish churches.3 More worryingly, ex-parliamentarians were
assumed (rightly, in some cases) to be stockpiling weapons and ammunition.
Royalist veterans presented the Restoration authorities with further problems. Having
been deprived of financial assistance during the Interregnum, thousands of impoverished
and maimed royalist soldiers and widows expected to be rewarded for their loyalty. In
placating any one body of veterans, therefore, the authorities risked arousing the resent-
ment of others. Any misjudgement might reignite lingering antipathies and undermine the
process of national reconciliation. Consequently, whilst the demobilisation of the army
was vital for long-term political stability, it was but one element of a larger and more
complex problem.
It is often written that historians have devoted more attention to the experiences of
parliamentarian soldiers during the civil wars and Interregnum than to their royalist
counterparts.4 The historiography of the Restoration is less straightforward.
Considerable work has been done on radicals after 1660, most notably by Richard L.
Greaves.5 The deployment of military veterans overseas has attracted some attention,
although relatively little has been published since the 1970s.6 More surprisingly, the
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disbandment of Cromwell’s old army has received a disjointed and perfunctory press.7
Finally, with notable exceptions such as Joyce Malcolm, scant consideration has been
given to the experience of non-radical demobilised veterans in Restoration communities,
much less their maimed comrades and war widows.8
One explanation for such uneven coverage may be that these seemingly disparate issues
have invariably been considered inter alia.9 By contrast, the activities of veterans and the
strategies adopted by Restoration officials indicate that suchmatters were closely connected; a
situation that scholars investigating the experience of ex-soldiers in modern post-conflict
cultures would recognise as “veteran politics”.10 The interaction between veterans, civilian
communities and the Restoration state therefore offers a useful early example of the genre.
***
General George Monck led his regiments across the Anglo-Scottish border in January
1660 with the intention of restoring stability to a rudderless and disintegrating
Commonwealth. During the process of facing down rival generals and reaching
London, he publicly set his face against a revived monarchy. Crucially, however, he
also declared his abhorrence of “the intolerable slavery of sword government”.11 The
general was, after all, a Presbyterian, and his subsequent metamorphosis from stalwart
Cromwellian to pragmatic royalist was entirely consistent with a Presbyterian’s instinct
for political and social order. By April, following unsuccessful attempts to prop up first
the Rump and then the reconstituted Long Parliament, he and a majority of MPs had come
to accept that a restored monarchy offered the best chance of a permanent political
solution. Monck had managed to keep the army reasonably quiet since being appointed
commander-in-chief by the Long Parliament at the end of February, but there had been
incidents of mutiny and disorder. He was well aware that it would be harder to retain
control during the period of the king’s return, let alone during the events that must follow.
Monck’s task was made more complicated by the fact that the “Old Army” was not the
army which had fought at Worcester. Arguably, it was more heterogeneous than it had ever
been, espousing a wide range of religious and political opinions. There had been a significant
turnover of personnel since 1651, although many veterans are thought to have re-enlisted
during the Protectorate. It would be rash to assume that Charles II had many admirers among
the younger recruits; however, those too young to have fought in the civil wars were also too
young to remember a functioning monarchy. Finally, there was now considerably less
empathy between officers and men. From the moment of its inception as the New Model
15 years earlier successive political experiments had prompted waves of resignations, dis-
missals and reinstatements as officers fell in and out of favour. This structural instability had
rendered the officer corps increasingly susceptible to manipulation from above but had also
tended to distance them from their soldiers. Monck had ruthlessly cashiered disaffected
subordinates in Scotland, promoting officers more in tune with his own opinions. In con-
junction with Parliament, he now took a similar course with the army in England, replacing
any officers likely to prove resistant to regime change.12 Sir Edward Hyde, unnerved by such
thoroughness, fretted that as soon as the royal party landed in England his royal master would
be inMonck’s “absolute power”.13 Such fears were misplaced: the general did not desire such
power; moreover, his authority over the army was not absolute, nor likely to be permanent.
In May 1660, the army (excluding units in Flanders and Jamaica) consisted of 36
regiments of foot, 20 regiments of horse, 1 regiment of dragoons, plus numerous
independent companies and garrisons.14 A whiff of radicalism still permeated its ranks:
months earlier Monck and his officers had warned Parliament that “Persons of dangerous
Principles” remained even within the regiments which had marched from Scotland.15 This
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nervousness was still evident on 5 May, when in the course of a letter to the king Monck’s
confidant William Morrice alluded to “ill humours” within the army.16 These ill humours
had arisen more from practical grievances than ideology, but the mutinies of 1647 had
demonstrated that it was unwise to overlook the men’s basic needs. Monck’s soldiers had
kept faith with him in Scotland, not least because he had taken pains to ensure that they
were regularly paid. It is no accident that after his arrival in London, the general began to
emphasise the need to do the same for the entire army. Other proposals would prove more
contentious, namely that the soldiers be indemnified for past actions and that a fair
settlement be made regarding crown and Church lands previously made over to the
army in lieu of pay. The pressure for a resolution on this last point came from officers
in England and Ireland rather than those who had accompanied Monck from Scotland
(most of whom had received their commissions after the lands had been parcelled out).17
How much this issue troubled the rank and file is unclear. Most private soldiers who had
been given a proportional interest in these estates had long since been persuaded to sell
their debentures to officers at knock-down prices. The soldiers’ resentment was noted as
late as 1659, although William Cole’s diatribe appears to refer to historical grievances.18
A deputation of officers met with Monck at the start of March 1660 to press for an
equitable land settlement. The general forbade them to publish their remonstrance and
ordered them back to their respective regiments. Nevertheless, it was clear that many
officers and men would require assurance on this and the other points before they could be
persuaded to accept a restored monarchy.
Monck was probably sincere in his advocacy of soldiers’ rights and in any case
certainly took care to appear sympathetic. His public stance seems to have helped mollify
the soldiery during the critical weeks of April and May. The general and his political allies
were considerably more diplomatic when relaying such propositions to Charles II, how-
ever, as it was impolitic to force the king to haggle publicly for the throne. In any case, the
Declaration of Breda (issued in April and presented to Parliament on 1 May) demonstrated
that the exiled court was fully cognisant of the need to placate the army. The king’s
promise to respect tender consciences helped reassure respectable Presbyterians (among
them many army officers), at the same time as it gave hope to those of more independent
views (among them many rank and file). Charles made a firm commitment to satisfy the
army’s arrears, but undertook to be guided by Parliament in the more complex issues of
indemnity, land settlement and religious toleration.19
On 16 May 1660, Charles wrote to “our trusty and well-beloved” Lord General
Monck in response to news that the officers of the army had formally engaged to accept
a restoration of the monarchy. He thanked the officers and men for their obedience and
affection, declaring that “We shall always have an entire confidence in them”.20 This show
of mutual regard was, of course, intended principally for public consumption. Monck
directed that the letter be published on 24 May, on the eve of Charles’ landing. The
civilian population was thereby assured that the army would not obstruct the king’s
progress through Kent, and that it was now permissible – indeed, desirable – to express
enthusiasm for the incoming regime. Selected royalist gentry were given permission to
gather men in arms to attend the king, although Monck was careful to specify the size and
location of their assemblies and the routes and timings of their marches. Monck’s chaplain
later claimed that this was because his master wished to ensure that the gentlemen were
properly accommodated. It is far more likely that Monck’s main objective was to mini-
mise the risk of clashes with regular army regiments then moving towards Blackheath.21
If there were only 3000 ex-Commonwealth troops on parade on the heath, they were
almost certainly outnumbered from the outset by casual spectators, possibly swelled by
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the armed royalist retinues whom Monck had licensed a few days earlier. In this taut
atmosphere, the general presented his senior officers to Charles, all of whom kissed the
king’s hand and received the royal benediction with every sign of humility and cheerful-
ness. Charles then turned to the rank and file and told them that they “were as brave
Troops as the World could shew”, and that he would “rather to have them Loyal Subjects
as they now protested, then (what some of them had been formerly) Violent Enemies”.
Hyde, meanwhile, nervously scanned the men’s faces, and decided that their countenances
“did sufficiently manifest, that They were drawn thither to a Service They were not
delighted in”.22 The Lord Mayor, sheriffs and aldermen of London arrived shortly after
the presentations to escort the king to St George’s Fields – accompanied by the massed
regiments of the London Trained Bands.23 These militia regiments had been placed under
Monck’s command some weeks earlier, and the timing of their arrival indicates that
considerable thought had been given to keeping the regular army units as calm as
possible. If Charles had been assassinated at Blackheath, the resultant political crisis
might well have embroiled the country in a new civil war; as it was, Monck’s attention
to detail ensured that the event passed peacefully.
Over the coming weeks London’s stationers warmed to the business of beatifying
George Monck. Ballads, sermons and tracts all helped to refashion the general as a
lifelong royalist and the hero of the Restoration. His years of loyal service to Oliver
Cromwell were either discreetly forgotten or portrayed as a form of enforced servitude.24
With the king safely ensconced in Whitehall and his own moral authority enhanced by the
press, Monck turned to the task of demobilising the army.
Large-scale disbandment had been attempted before. Eighteen thousand men had been
demobilised in 1647, although not without considerable difficulties. In 1654, Cromwell,
seeking to ease the burden of taxation on the civilian population, had followed the less
confrontational course of reducing the number of men in each company.25 The task facing
Charles II’s ministers was considerably more delicate. Although Monck had neutered the
officer corps, this demobilisation was to be larger and more permanent than anything
previously attempted; more than this, it was to serve the interests of Charles Stuart, who
only weeks before had been the army’s sworn enemy.
The Commonwealth authorities had begun their own preparations to disband the army
in 1659, dispersing regiments throughout England in an effort to avoid a repeat of the
1647 mutinies. In February 1660, worried by indications that the troops were becoming
restless, the Commons had issued a declaration that all officers and soldiers should remain
in their designated areas. This, the MPs hoped, would ensure the maintenance of good
order and discipline and prevent the army from becoming “an Oppression to the
Country”.26 The efficacy of this strategy was tested in April, when General Lambert
escaped from custody and called on the army to rally to him at Edgehill. Because
relatively few units joined him on the old battlefield, the seriousness of this incident
has been underestimated; however, as Ronald Hutton has pointed out, “it is striking, and
significant, how much active opposition to the government Lambert’s escape actually did
let loose”.27 As it was impossible to know how many men within the army remained
sympathetic to the Good Old Cause, the safest course was to disband the entire force as
soon as practicable.
John Childs has calculated that the total cost of disbanding the army was £835,819 8s
10d, noting in addition that the forces in Dunkirk, Ireland and elsewhere continued to
require substantial sums over and above this figure.28 The money was to be raised from an
on-going series of monthly assessments, a poll tax and the Crown’s own resources. As the
summer wore on the Convention Parliament became immersed in the complex business of
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resurrecting the Stuart church and state. The removal of the army was, naturally, a crucial
element in this, and by the end of 1660, MPs had rushed through no less than eight Acts
to fund and expedite the demobilisation. It is evident from the fact that two of these Acts
were passed to correct defects in the original hurried legislation, and from the moves to
renew the monthly assessments, that the authorities grossly underestimated the amount of
money which would be needed.29
Improvisation at the centre caused problems in the provinces. Commissioners in
Lancashire, for example, claimed to be so confused by government instructions that
they were at a loss to know how to proceed.30 The rhetoric which had accompanied
Charles II’s restoration had led his new subjects to expect a peace dividend as well as law
and order. Consequently, the new regime could ill afford to appear incoherent whilst at the
same time demanding ever greater amounts of money from taxpayers. Many proved
reluctant to pay the “army tax”, even in parishes close to the seat of government.31
Such tardiness compounded the government’s problems, as each month added thousands
of pounds to soldiers’ and sailors’ arrears.32 Monck (created duke of Albemarle in July
1660) and other national commissioners sat on the Parliamentary committee which had
been set up to oversee the disbandment. They put pressure on provincial authorities to
attend ever more vigorously to the task of collecting taxes to pay off soldiers’ arrears and
were prepared to use the army itself as an instrument of coercion.33 In August, the
committee advised Kentish commissioners that prompt payment would help ensure that
their county would not have to provide free quarter for the troops.34 This was no empty
threat: in November, specific towns and communities in Cambridgeshire and the West
Country selected to pay off the regiments of O’Neale and Ingoldsby were also required to
billet those particular units at free quarter until they could be disbanded.35 In this, the
committee proved less squeamish than the king, who implored Parliament to avoid the
imposition of free quarter if at all possible.36
Many counties did prove willing and able to follow orders, and the commissioners
received sufficient money to enable the disbandment to commence.37 Those who wished
to prosper under the new regime were repeatedly reminded that they could demonstrate
their loyalty by helping with the project, or lending money to pay off the soldiers’ arrears,
thereby rendering “very good and acceptable service to the Kingdome”.38 The
Parliamentary committee itself included notable ex-parliamentarians such as Colonel
John Birch and William Prynne. Nevertheless, discord emerged between those working
together to facilitate the disbandment. A Buckinghamshire tax collector, Robert Fletcher
wrote in his preamble to accounts for the parish of Little Hampden that the tax was to pay
for “the armies and navie of this Commonwealth of England”. His fellow collector John
Numan, clearly offended, scoured out the term “Commonwealth”, and above it wrote the
word “Kingdome” in thick black ink.39 William Prynne committed a more public indis-
cretion. On 6 November, Parliament heard that 16 regiments, 11 garrisons and various
smaller units in England and Scotland were yet to be disbanded, and that even after the
assessments and poll tax had been collected a further £422,000 would be needed. In
addition, £200,000 was required to replenish the Naval stores, which had now run out of
essential supplies.40 During the subsequent debate, Prynne cautioned the House “to be
mindful not to do those Things which might bring them (the Army) together again”. He
was sharply called to order and threatened with formal censure.41
Parliament’s anxiety was justified. At the Kent Quarter Sessions in October 1660, the
Justices had already noted a marked increase in crime in their county and ordered an
armed watch in each hundred to guard against a spate of robberies and other offences
which had caused “great damage and terror” to the local population. The miscreants were
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identified as “Rogues, vagabonds and other dangerous persons”, but it is more than
possible that many were demobilised soldiers.42 Albemarle had already been forced to
reprimand officers and men still under his command for numerous outbreaks of law-
lessness. Within days of Prynne’s outburst, he found it necessary to organise patrols in and
around London to combat a sudden and steep rise in incidents of armed robbery.43 As the
army was now officially under royal command, such delinquency not only served to
further sour civilian attitudes towards soldiers but also tarnished the image of the Crown.
Such considerations lay behind a royal proclamation in December 1660, which deprecated
the bad behaviour exhibited by hordes of dissolute and disaffected soldiery prowling
around London and its suburbs.44 It was inevitable that as more and more soldiers were
paid off they would become increasingly harder to police; consequently, at least eight
further royal proclamations were issued between 1661 and 1670, ordering demobilised
veterans to leave the capital during the festivals of Christmas and Easter, and also during
the traditional rioting month of May.45
Riots had long been a feature of provincial English life, usually little more than a
noisy method of negotiation regarding specific localised grievances. These grievances
would most often be resolved in rituals of mutual empathy and reciprocity between rulers
and ruled, all of which served to confirm rather than challenge the “natural” authority of
the state. London was a different matter. Riots in the capital had rarely been viewed with
equanimity, not least because of the potentially large numbers involved and their close
proximity to the centre of state power. After 1660, given the upheavals of the previous
decade, the new regime could not assume that rioters would automatically view the
monarchy as the “natural” form of government, particularly if their ranks included
parliamentarian veterans. Legislation was duly enacted in order to reduce opportunities
for large assemblies, most obviously the 1661 Act against Tumultuous Petitioning.46 Even
with such measures in place, many within the establishment remained obsessed with the
notion that demobilised soldiers were initiating and organising civil disorder in the capital.
The alarm shown by John Nicholas during the Bawdy House Riots of 1668 is a case in
point; Nicholas informing his father Sir Edward that there “were some of the old Army-
Officers seene amongst the Rioters and Prentices yesterday to animate & incite them on,
wch [we] are searching after”.47
Official attitudes towards parliamentarian veterans therefore hardened appreciably as
more and more soldiers returned to civilian life. Just as Charles II had complimented the
bearing of the army in May 1660, so Sir Edward Hyde publicly praised its sobriety in
September. Three months later his tone had changed. Now earl of Clarendon and Lord
Chancellor he acquainted Parliament with the first of many plots supposedly hatched by
disbanded veterans intent on replacing the nascent monarchy with a republican common-
wealth.48 Such vigilance appeared to be vindicated in January 1661 when Thomas Venner
led a party of Fifth Monarchists on a rampage through London. The insurgency was soon
contained, but only after fatalities and serious disorder. Unsurprisingly, the episode
goaded the establishment into using more strident rhetoric. Royal proclamations ordering
demobilised soldiers out of London and Westminster in April and November 1661
stressed that “they spare not to give out words threatening mischiefs to Our Royal
Person, and to these Our Cities”, and that they were “Plotting and Contriving wicked
Designs and Practices against Our Royal Person, and the Peace and Government of this
Kingdom”.49 Reports streamed in from all over the country regarding suspicious activity.
Nervousness pervaded as far as Cornwall, where in August 1661 correspondents dis-
cussed the possibility of trouble from “officers from the old Army”.50
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Venner’s Rising gave added impetus to three political initiatives already then in
motion: royal control over the county lieutenancy, the formation of a paramilitary loyalist
volunteer force and a covert campaign to disarm the civilian population. Charles II was
from the outset keen to establish an exclusive control over all matters pertaining to the
county militias; a sensible ambition given that his father’s failure to establish such control
in 1641 had had fatal consequences. Between 1660 and 1661, Charles oversaw the
appointment of the new county lord lieutenants and their deputies and used the royal
prerogative to sanction a significant expansion of their traditional powers as regards the
policing of the shires. Such measures were intended primarily as a precaution against the
civil disorder which, it was widely anticipated, would accompany the disbanding of the
army.51 Following the election of the so-called “Cavalier” Parliament in May 1661, the
king was even willing to go against his own instincts and allow Cavalier-Anglican MPs to
indulge in a divisive programme of religious repression in return for legal recognition of
his exclusive right to control the trained bands. The political horse-trading which pro-
duced the Act of Uniformity (1662) therefore also produced the Militia Acts of 1661 and
1662.
Despite gaining an unprecedented level of control over the county militia, Charles II
and his advisors were never confident of its efficacy or political reliability. Oliver
Cromwell had set up an auxiliary body known as the “select militia” during the
Protectorate and had used it to relieve the regular army and county trained bands of
much of their policing duties. This “select militia” appears, unsurprisingly, to have been
made up of parliamentarian veterans, 27,000 cavalry and 200 infantry chosen for their
affection for the regime. Being paid a yearly retainer of £8 out of the public purse, the
men gained the nickname “eight-pound troopers”. Royalist supporters saw fit to assemble
their own paramilitary police force after the Restoration. Charles II’s “volunteer militia”
(to use Joyce Malcolm’s term) was also composed largely of cavalry, as these could patrol
over a wider area than foot soldiers. Unlike the select militia, it was intended to be self-
financing, an important consideration as it was probably much larger than its Cromwellian
counterpart – conceivably over 90,000 men.52 Although nominally under the control of
the county lieutenancy, these vigilante groups appear to have been allowed considerable
latitude in harassing and roughing up former parliamentarians. Malcolm considers that
most of the officers had served in the royalist forces during the civil wars, and that
paramilitary commissions gratified their egos at the same time as giving them “some
power over their old opponents”.53 Having said this, at least one disgruntled Kentish
gentleman, Sir Robert Moyle, refused his commission, it being a lower rank than the
colonelcy he had held formerly.54 It is unfortunate that we have so little information
regarding the rank-and-file volunteers in these units. It would be helpful to know if and
how they were recompensed, as it is unlikely that many common troopers could have
maintained themselves and their horses during repeated and prolonged periods of service.
Many lord lieutenants found the volunteer militia useful in suppressing disaffection in
the localities.55 More than this, by organising thousands of loyalist activists in this manner
the state was better able to channel and restrain the more violent proclivities of popular
royalism. The bitter legacy of the civil wars had in many cases been aggravated by petty
vendettas and harassment during the Interregnum. Some injustices were rectified peace-
fully by official means, as when the parish officials of Hursley, Hampshire were ordered
by Restoration magistrates to make amends for having previously prevented a royalist
veteran from living in his own home.56 Many royalists, however, were tempted to exact
unofficial retribution. In 1661, for example, John Maidstone, a former steward of the Lord
Protector’s household living in Great Horkesley, Essex, was wounded by three men from
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neighbouring Boxted. In nearby Braintree, a royalist felt-maker clashed in the street with
two former eight-pound troopers over past loyalties.57 Such wanton acts of private
revenge undermined the Crown’s attempts to revivify its role as the guardian of the public
peace. They also drove many parliamentarian veterans to procure weapons for personal
protection – an unwelcome development given the desire of the national authorities for a
nationwide disarmament.58
In more peaceful times, the middling and poorer sorts had traditionally been discour-
aged from keeping weapons through legal devices such as the Game Act (1609).59 By
contrast, the post-conflict society of the Restoration was one where weapons were
plentiful and the majority of adult males familiar with their use. Although many of the
weapons produced or imported during the wars had been rendered unserviceable, thou-
sands remained unaccounted for.60 In October 1660, Deputy Lieutenants in Hampshire
received instructions in the king’s name to search for and seize all arms and munitions
held by “any person of suspected, or knowne disaffection to us, and the quiet of the
Kingdome”. Many Hampshire residents proved unwilling to surrender their weapons,
however, causing the Deputy Lieutenants and militia to adopt a more robust approach,
reinforced by a troop of the King’s Lifeguard supplied by Albemarle expressly for the
purpose.61 The Privy Council spread the net more widely after Venner’s Rising, ordering
county officials to disarm not only persons of “wicked and rebellious Principles”, but also
anyone who had “by worde or actions showne any disaffection to his Ma[jes]tie, or his
Government or in any kind disturbed the publick peace”.62 The royal proclamation of 28
November 1661 which ordered all disbanded officers and soldiers from London also laid a
responsibility on Deputy Lieutenants to ensure that these individuals were not in posses-
sion of any kind of offensive weapon.63 Such orders gave the Deputy Lieutenants and the
volunteer militia licence to enter any home in search of weapons and arrest anyone they
pleased.
Large caches of arms discovered during these searches appeared to vindicate the Privy
Council’s stance. In January 1661, Laurence Moyer of Low Leyton in Essex was found to
possess five pistols, one carbine, two barrels of black powder and one small artillery
piece. Moyer claimed that he needed the firearms for personal protection.64 A raid on the
Boxted home of John Maidstone’s kinsman, Robert Maidstone, unearthed several weap-
ons, which he admitted formed part of a larger hoard.65 Similar discoveries were made in
other counties.66 The authorities were particularly exercised by the prospect that ex-
parliamentarian officers might be distributing weapons amongst their former soldiers.
One of Cromwell’s major-generals, Hezekiah Haynes, was found to possess a relatively
modest arsenal, but admitted that he had given away firearms over the previous months.
Haynes initially claimed to have forgotten the names of the recipients, but finally yielded
information which enabled the Deputy Lieutenants to track several items to men in Essex,
Suffolk and London who had formerly served under his command.67 The sheer volume of
weaponry seized around the country during 1661–1663 eventually exceeded the storage
capacity of the Tower of London, necessitating the construction of additional buildings in
the grounds.68
If politics during the first two years of the Restoration had been overshadowed by the
spectre of the army and fears regarding demobilised veterans, matters were to be trans-
formed by the marriage of Charles II to the Portuguese princess Catherine of Braganza in
1662. Her dowry promised a catalogue of financial and economic benefits, including the
Portuguese possessions of Tangier and Bombay. The marriage treaty signed a year earlier
had already sealed the fate of several remaining units of the Old Army.69 Portugal
desperately needed troops in order to resume its struggle for independence from Spain.
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This was a heaven-sent opportunity for the English authorities as it had become obvious
that assessments and taxes would not yield sufficient money to allow the army to be
completely disbanded. Dunkirk was an unremitting drain on resources, whilst resentment
at the continued presence of English troops in Scotland had already led to riots in
Edinburgh.70 The strategy which underpinned the Portuguese marriage treaty was a
variation on a familiar theme: it had become something of a tradition for English regimes
to reduce social and economic tensions by forcing the surplus male population into
military service abroad. The bulk of the Dunkirk garrison was reassigned to the new
English colony of Tangier. Three English foot regiments stationed in Scotland (including
many who had fought in the Flanders campaign of 1658–59), were reorganised into two
units, transported to Plymouth, and thence to Lisbon. They were soon joined by cavalry
composed of ex-parliamentarians, old royalists and Irish troopers who had served Charles
in Flanders. The redeployments were presented to the public not as a cynical disposal of
inconvenient flesh but as an honourable and patriotic adventure. Mercurius Publicus
reported that on 2 May 1662, Major-General Sir Thomas Morgan (a distinguished
parliamentarian veteran of the civil wars) had drawn up one regiment outside the citadel
of Leith and made a short speech,
… acquainting them how great a value his Majesty had of them, & what care was taken for
their present supply both of money and clothes, with assurance of speedy payment of their
Arrears; that his Majesty had been graciously pleased to design them for honourable service
abroad, and that he himself (who had so long commanded them in that Countrey) resolved to
ship with them, and made no doubt of their readiness to so honorable an Expedition.
Whereupon not one man expressing the least unwillingness, they all with great acclamations
of joy both Officers and Souldiers cried out All, All, All, to follow him to serve their King and
Countrey, and so marcht back again into the Cittadel, where he gave the Souldiers money to
drink his Majesties Health.71
The private correspondence of their new commander, the infamous Murrough O’Brien,
earl of Inchiquin, shows him to have been considerably less sanguine about the soldiers’
morale when they disembarked in Lisbon two months later.72 Mercurius Publicus never-
theless continued to provide positive coverage, insisting that the expedition had been
attended by “success” all the way south, and that the men had been encouraged by a jovial
quayside speech from Inchiquin. The earl declared that they were two of the best
regiments he had ever seen, and “that his only fear was that they would destroy
themselves faster than their Enemies, by taking too much new wine and fruit”. He
promised that “for his part he would take all possible care of them; whereupon the
Souldiers joyfully acknowledg’d him for their Generall”.73
Between 1662 and 1668 around 4500 soldiers were sent to serve in the Iberian
Peninsula. They were badly fed, poorly supplied, rarely paid and died in droves.
Several individuals among the officer corps, including Thomas Morgan, resigned their
commands and returned home as soon as decently possible. The common soldiers had no
such means of escape and were forced to endure regular harangues from officers such as
Guy Molesworth, an embittered ex-royalist, who considered them to be “Cromwells
whelps and Rebels”, sent to Portugal “for murdering the late King and were as banished
men”.74 The English authorities strongly disapproved of such language, as also any
suggestion that royalist veterans were equally expendable. Molesworth was duly charged
with demoralising the soldiery, and also of having insulted the king by asserting that
honest Cavaliers had been sent to be destroyed in the company of rebels.75 His court
martial was one of several scandals from Portugal to go unreported in the English press;
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hardly surprising as London editors were firmly under the thumb of Sir Henry Bennet,
Secretary of State. The official investigation into the scandals was equally discreet, being
conducted in Albemarle’s personal quarters at Whitehall.76 The Brigade rarely featured in
the English press after 1662, but the isolated items that were published were invariably
given a patriotic gloss.77
Only 800 members of the Brigade survived to see Portugal and Spain make peace in
1668. Four hundred of these were promptly reassigned to Tangier. Their obvious dismay
at being sent there suggests that Tangier had by now acquired its reputation as a death
trap.78 Besieged by Moorish forces the defence of the colony had already used up some
2500 troops, ranging from Irish Catholics to allegedly violent republicans.79 Few of the
400 can have survived by the time Tangier was abandoned in 1684. The origins, character
and number of troops sent to garrison England’s other acquisition, Bombay, awaits proper
investigation: between February and March 1662, approximately 500 soldiers were
organised into four companies and shipped from England to the East Indies. Arriving
off the Indian subcontinent in September, they were placed under the command of yet
another veteran of the civil wars, the ex-royalist Sir Abraham Shipman. Within 2 years
over 300 men had succumbed to various diseases and the alien climate.80 The Portuguese
match enabled the state to eliminate at least 7500 veterans, and thereby remove one of the
largest obstacles to political and religious reform.
There is much to commend Ian Green’s suggestion that the continuance of the army
may have stayed the government’s hand on any moves to impose a religious settlement
until 1662.81 The Restoration regime’s anxieties in this regard have often been discounted
by historians, usually on the grounds that radicals were divided and comparatively few in
number. However, Charles’ ministers were well aware that radicals posed a minimal threat
to the state; Fifth Monarchists, for example, were reported to be “weak, though never
quiet”.82 We should also be less eager to assume (the present writer having been as guilty
as any) that there was no love lost between army veterans and Presbyterian clergy.
Moderate nonconformists were considerably more numerous and better connected than
radicals, and the frequency with which Anglican preachers, Cavalier journalists and even
government officials launched vitriolic attacks on Presbyterians suggests that many within
the establishment perceived them to be the greater threat.83 As has been noted above, the
army housed a wide range of religious and political views, added to which Monck’s
remodelling of the officer corps had restored many Presbyterians to military commands.
These, by and large, were the kind of socially conservative Puritans who had connived at
the expulsion of radical clergy from the Church of England in 1660, but who could be
expected to resent – perhaps even resist – the ejection of moderate Presbyterian ministers
and the imposition of a narrow Cavalier-Anglican liturgy. Neither Charles II nor
Clarendon welcomed the Uniformity Bill, and their initial attempts to sabotage it pro-
voked a furious response from Bishop Sheldon and his Cavalier-Anglican supporters
among the provincial gentry.84 It is arguable how far the king’s disinclination can be
attributed to his oft-stated desire for religious comprehension and how much he feared the
reaction of the army. What is not in doubt is that by the time the Uniformity bill received
the royal assent on 19 May 1662, the Portuguese treaty had finally removed the army as a
political force, giving Cavalier-Anglicans a freer hand to impose the religious settlement
and allowing the Crown to police the local communities more aggressively. Once set on
the course mapped out by the Act of Uniformity royal officials acted to ensure that
veterans and nonconformist ministers would not be able to make common cause. As 24
August drew near – the day by which all Church of England clergy were required to
comply with the Act or quit their livings – large numbers of ex-parliamentarian officers
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around the country were taken into custody.85 Even after the crisis had passed the Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland continued to monitor the correspondence of disbanded officers in
that country with others in England “known to be especially disaffected to the English
Church”.86 In England itself, the episode had given Deputy Lieutenants and magistrates
the taste for maintaining records not only on ex-parliamentarian officers but also on large
swathes of the hitherto anonymous rank and file – proof (if more were needed) of the
extent to which the civil wars had politicised people at all social levels.87
One category of veteran had long been the subject of close scrutiny. Ian Gentles has
estimated that the civil wars caused approximately 90,000 casualties in England and
Wales alone, burdening local communities with unprecedented numbers of maimed
men, widows and orphans.88 Parliament’s supporters had always been more vocal than
their royalist counterparts in demanding provision for such unfortunates, with the result
that war relief had become an integral part of the parliamentarian war effort as well as a
moral duty. By 1648, Parliament had replaced the inadequate parish-based provision
enshrined in Elizabethan legislation with a reasonably efficient system.89 Charles there-
fore assumed responsibility for thousands of “enemy” pensioners at the Restoration. Six
and a half thousand ex-parliamentarian soldiers and widows received their pensions either
from Ely House or the Savoy military hospitals in London. The charge to the state,
£30,000 per annum, equated to almost half the annual cost of maintaining the two English
garrisons in Flanders.90 Thousands more depended on pensions administered in the
counties by the Justices of the Peace. The remainder, including ex-royalists, subsisted
on parish and private charity. Neither Monck nor anyone else appears to have sought any
assurances regarding these vulnerable individuals as a precondition to Charles’
restoration; a puzzling omission, as the army had always given the issue a high priority
during previous crises. As it was, the continuation of war relief after 1660 would
exacerbate tensions and place further strain on local economies already depressed by
war-damaged infrastructures and high taxation.
In September 1660, at a meeting held to discuss progress in disbanding the army,
Clarendon pointed out to representatives of the Lords and Commons that Ely House and
the Savoy were still “full of maimed Soldiers; and that some Care will be necessary to be
taken for Discharge of them”.91 Lord Thomas Fairfax had lobbied in 1659 for the
pensioners’ arrears to be paid, but it was clear even then that these once excellent
institutions were in terminal decline.92 In December 1660, with the demobilisation of
the army well advanced, the inmates and pensioners of the two hospitals were quietly
given a final payment and discharged.93 As there is no evidence of a mass influx of
claimants in Quarter Sessions records, the individuals concerned were presumably
referred to their parishes of origin.
The problems represented by Ely House and the Savoy were relatively straightforward
compared with the situation in the provinces. During the Interregnum, Justices had
entertained petitions from maimed parliamentarian soldiers and widows at the county
Quarter Sessions, issuing orders to the Treasurers for Maimed Soldiers to pay from the
county stock those deemed worthy of financial support. Maimed royalist veterans and
widows had not been considered. Nonetheless, it would become clear after the Restoration
that thousands had survived. As a result, veterans would continue to take up an inordinate
amount of the courts’ time in the early years of the Restoration.
Few Commissions of the Peace were purged so thoroughly after the Restoration as to
remove all traces of the Interregnum. Nevertheless, whereas counties such as Wiltshire,
Sussex and Essex retained a leaven of ex-parliamentarians and Cromwellians on the
Bench, magistrates in counties such as Devon and Kent were overwhelmingly Cavalier-
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Anglican.94 The demeanour of the Justices in Kent was indicative of particularly strong
royalist affiliations in the north and west of the county, areas which had a history of
antagonism towards parliamentarianism dating back to the insensitive rule of the parlia-
mentary county committee in the 1640s. The distribution of petitions after the Restoration
indicates that northwest Kent had supplied a disproportionate number of royalist recruits
during the Second Civil War of 1648, and families there had suffered all the more
grievously as a consequence. The prevalence of popular royalism and intense local
distaste for the army may explain why Kent moved more quickly and more aggressively
against parliamentarian pensioners than neighbouring counties. With one exception, all
parliamentarian war pensions administered by the county were terminated at the
Michaelmas Quarter Sessions in October 1660.95 By contrast, wholesale cessations of
parliamentarian pensions did not occur in Essex until April 1661, and even then at least
two new claimants received gratuities.96 Justices in both Sussex and Surrey did not begin
to terminate parliamentarian pensions until January 1662, and at least one Sussex parlia-
mentarian had his pension confirmed the following August.97
The cessation of parliamentarian war pensions did not draw a line under the civil
wars. Parliamentarian pensioners ceased to be a charge on the county stock, but as
most were incapable of work the economic burden cannot simply have disappeared,
and might yet be found in parish records. In addition, some able-bodied veterans
appear to have caused a further drain on local resources by resorting to crime.
Although John Childs’ argument that the disbandment did not lead to a national
crime wave is still sound, there was, as has been noted above, a noticeable increase
in criminality in and around the capital. Childs is quite right to observe that the army
in 1660 was made up of volunteers rather than conscripts, but this in itself does not
preclude the possibility of localised crime waves, particularly around London.98 Early
modern crime was closely linked with economic vulnerability, and volunteers were
often little more than economic conscripts. The authorities were acutely aware of this,
which is why one of the many Acts passed to expedite the disbandment permitted
demobilised soldiers who had been under Monck’s command in April 1660 to follow
trades without completing their apprenticeships.99 The efficacy of this measure cannot
be assessed simply by quoting Pepys. Contrary to Robert Blackborne’s assertions
recorded in Pepys’ diary (that the soldiers of the Old Army had all found peaceful
employment by November 1663), it is unlikely that all veterans were able to follow
honest trades and live happily ever after.100
The economic impact of mental health problems among returned veterans is even
harder to measure, particularly in an age before the concept of post-traumatic stress
disorder. County authorities did sometimes provide for traumatised soldiers and their
families: in 1661, when John Horne of Buckland, Kent “in his madness did set on fire
and burne his own house”, leaving his family homeless, the matter was referred to the
Treasurer for Maimed Soldiers.101 Horne’s wife received financial relief, whilst Horne
himself was confined for his own protection. The incident is redolent of an earlier case in
Staffordshire, when a disturbed individual was reported to the county Justices for threa-
tening to “smoke all the parish, except 3 or 4 houses; for a soldier he had been, and a
soldier he would be, and would leave them all little enough”.102 Other social and
economic tensions arose from population displacement: when Justices in Kent checked
on the movement of ex-parliamentarians whose pensions they had terminated the year
before they found many “att some distance from their respective abode”.103 Each indivi-
dual was forced to return to his or her parish of settlement. There may, therefore, be more
to the Settlement Act (1662) than a desire to regulate the movement of the poor; it might
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also be seen as an attempt to reverse the effects of war-related economic migration.104 At
the same time as the authorities attempted to address these difficulties, however, they were
creating an even larger problem involving royalist veterans.
One of the enduring myths of the Restoration is that Charles II failed to provide for
needy royalists. Ballads such as The Cavalier’s Complaint (1661), pamphlets such as
Truth’s Discovery (1664) and intemperate speeches by former royalist officers in
Parliament helped create a pervasive image of the neglected Cavalier.105 In actuality,
strenuous efforts were made to recompense those who had suffered in the service of the
Crown during the civil wars and Interregnum. As ever, Kent took the lead in the Home
Counties: having dismissed their parliamentarian pensioners, the Justices immediately
began to bestow pensions on maimed royalist soldiers and widows.106 Geoffrey Hudson
has observed a marked discrimination against war widows in several Restoration counties,
but this was emphatically not the case in Kent.107 The Essex Quarter Sessions order book
from 1662 onwards has not survived to allow a direct comparison with Kent, but the
preceding book nevertheless shows some significant differences. First, there were notice-
ably fewer royalist petitions than in Kent, despite the fact that a considerable number of
Essex men had fought under royalist command in 1648. Second, in stark contrast to other
Home Counties, no royalist petitioner was granted a pension by the Essex Justices before
1662. In fact the Justices’ comments, after an acknowledgement of royalist war service,
most often ended with an instruction that the claimant was to accept the one-off gratuity
“as a farewell, and to trouble this Court noe further herein”.108 In at least three cases,
royalist veterans were simply referred to parish officials.109 Plainly, Essex Justices had no
desire to replace parliamentarian pensioners with royalist ones. Such reservations were
also evident amongst Hampshire Justices, as their order book recorded in October 1661
that they were “not fullie agreed uppon the settlem[en]t of the [royalist claimants]” and
were prepared only to make interim payments. Meagre pensions were eventually awarded
to 15 claimants in July 1662.110
The Hampshire Justices’ change of heart coincided with the passing of two relevant
pieces of Parliamentary legislation in June 1662. The first of these, an Act for
distributing £60,000 among indigent royalist officers, was funded by diverting
money from Charles’ personal income. The resultant list of over 5300 applicants,
published to discourage fraudulent claims, requires little introduction as it has been
extensively mined by historians of the civil wars.111 The king’s altruism was fortified
by a strong dash of self-interest: to leave thousands of loyal gentry so impoverished as
to be unable to participate in local society was clearly undesirable. The Act not only
helped redress this imbalance but also strengthened the recipients’ adherence to the
Crown.112 The second Act, “for the releife of poore and maimed Officers and
Souldiers who have faithfully served His Majesty and His Royal Father in the late
Wars” is less well known, but probably had a greater impact on local communities.113
If the continuance of the army stayed the government’s hand on religious matters it is
even more likely to have dictated the timing of these two Acts. For one thing, it had
been impracticable to order royalists to be relieved from the county stock until
sufficient numbers of parliamentarian pensioners had first been dismissed. Wiltshire
and Dorset alone ultimately maintained some 1142 royalist pensioners.114 In Kent,
diligent compliance with the Act resulted in so many new pensioners by September
1664 that the Justices were obliged to restrict pensions to 40 shillings per annum.115 In
their eagerness to do justice to royalist veterans and war widows the Cavalier-Anglican
rulers at the centre and peripheries of Restoration England had between them replaced
the ideologically repugnant provision for former rebels with an equally divisive
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provision for loyalists. In purely economic terms the strategy not only failed to deliver
a peace dividend, but resulted in significantly higher parish rates and an anxious search
for additional sources of local income.116
Time and the natural processes of mortality eventually resolved the veteran problem,
although nothing could prevent conflicting folk memories from being handed on to
subsequent generations. Many veterans, parliamentarian and royalist alike, must have
died during the plague epidemic of 1665–67; nevertheless, royalist veterans were still
applying to Quarter Sessions courts for financial relief as late as 1678.117 Ironically, the
most prominent victim of veteran politics proved to be the earl of Clarendon himself: one
of the charges laid against him in Parliament in 1667 alleged that he had attempted to
maintain the army in order to encourage the king to rule as a tyrant. The charge was
preposterous, but it was instrumental in ending his political career. Clarendon received no
sympathy from old parliamentarians; George Wither declared that, far from seeking to
preserve the army, the Lord Chancellor (and by extension the Restoration regime) had
brazenly condemned thousands of brave Englishmen to death when they had been
banished to places such as Tangier.118
The many excellent studies of the Restoration which have emerged since the 1980s
have demonstrated that the rehabilitation of the monarchy was a lengthy and complex
process, and that success was far from inevitable. Nevertheless, this new historiography
has increasingly tended to underplay the significance of the military within that process –
in particular the impact of veterans on social politics and cultural conflict within local
communities. It has therefore been timely to reiterate the centrality of veteran politics in
the restoration and consolidation of royal power, beginning with Monck’s adroit handling
of the army during the critical months of 1660. It would be too much to claim that the
events which followed ran to a meticulously planned schedule, but the nature and timing
of the measures implemented at national and local level indicates that the Restoration
authorities were acutely aware that the various military issues were related to one another,
and closely linked to wider political, religious and economic problems.
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105. Mackay, Cavalier Songs and Ballads, 209–12; Hammond, Truth’s Discovery; and John, My
Lord Lucas His Speech in the House of Peers, 4.
106. CKS-Q/SO W1, fos. 62–3v, 69–71, 74–6v, 79v, 83, 86, 91–2, 103, 120; CKS-Q/SO E1, fos.
55, 61, 66v.
107. Hudson, “Negotiating for Blood Money,” 151.
108. E.g. ERO Q/SO1, fos. 259v, 263v, 264v, 268v.
109. E.g. ERO Q/SO1, fo. 266v.
110. HRO Q1/4, fos. 70, 74.
111. Statutes of the Realm, v, 380–9; List of Officers Claiming Sixty ; Newman, “The 1663 list,”
885–904.
112. See Appleby, “Restoration County Community,” 101–2, 112–13.
113. 14 Car. II. c. 9; Statutes of the Realm, v, 389–90.
114. Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, 295–6.
115. CKS Q/SO W1, fo. 103v.
116. CKS Q/SO E1, fo. 68v; HRO Q1/4, fos. 100, 105, 106; Surrey Quarter Sessions Records, 63.
117. ERO S/SBa2, fo. 124 (Petition of Thomas Petchey, 1678).
118. Wither, Vox & Lacrimae Anglorum, 14.
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